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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following scenario:
Fred and Sally Smith were high school sweethearts. They have been
married for two years and living in Tarrant County, Texas. Fred
started emotionally abusing Sally during their courtship in high
school-separating her from her friends and family, insulting her,
threatening to leave her, and eventually controlling her daily activities. Following their marriage, Fred began physically abusing Sally; at
first, he would only push and slap, but he quickly escalated to
punching.
One night, Fred comes home from work and begins to question
Sally about rumors he has heard. Fred accuses her of cheating on him
with one of her coworkers. Sally denies having an affair and tries to
convince Fred that she would never cheat. Despite her protests, Fred
continues to accuse Sally of lying and cheating and begins pushing and
slapping her. Sally begins crying and begs Fred to believe her, but
Fred punches Sally in the face, knocking off her glasses, and pushes
her onto their bed. Sally begs for Fred's forgiveness, but he continues
1. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
t The Author thanks Professors Lynne Rambo and J. Richard Broughton for
their critiques during the writing process. The Author also thanks Cheyenne
Robertson and the law review staff, especially Matt Dixon, David Pratt, Shawna
Snellgrove, and Andrea Starns for their careful editing. And last, but definitely, not
least, the Author thanks her husband, Shawn, for his support and love throughout the
law school process.
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to punch her in the face until she starts bleeding. Eventually, Fred
stops punching Sally and leaves her alone in the bedroom. Minutes
later, the police arrive, responding to a neighbor's 911 call. The police
officers observe Sally: she is crying, visibly shaking, and has blood on
her face and clothing, a black eye, and additional bruising on her face.
One of the officers asks Sally if she needs an ambulance and Sally
immediately tells the officer about the events that occurred and identifies Fred as her attacker. As Sally is taken to the hospital for treatment, Fred is arrested and charged with assault against a member of
his family or household.'
Sally enters a battered women's shelter. There she is assisted by a
social worker who helps her obtain a protective order, begin divorce
proceedings, and aid in the police investigation against Fred. After a
month, however, Sally, like many abuse victims, decides to reconcile
with Fred and returns to their home. She informs the prosecuting attorney that she no longer wants to press charges and refuses to testify
against Fred.' The prosecutor decides to proceed to trial without
Sally, a decision commonly made when a victim chooses not to cooperate in the prosecution of her abuser.
At Fred's trial, in the 324th Tarrant County District Court, the prosecutor uses a tactic often employed in domestic violence prosecutions
without a testifying victim witness: questioning the responding officer
about Sally's statements made to him at the scene. Before the officer
can respond, Fred's attorney objects to the line of questioning, stating
that the testimony would constitute hearsay. Fred's attorney explains
that Sally's statements to the officer that she was hit and that Fred was
her attacker are being offered for the truth of the matter asserted and
that their admission would be in violation of Fred's right to confrontation under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 4 as established by the Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington.5 Facing
possible exclusion of key evidence, the prosecution must respond...
The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford potentially hinders the
prosecution in domestic violence cases by possibly eliminating the current practice of admitting the non-testifying victim's statements
2. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (Vernon 1994) for the relevant statutory provision.
3. While the prosecutor has the option to subpoena Sally and compel her testimony, this choice is based on trial strategy and policy of the prosecutor's office. See
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.10 (Vernon 2005); TEX. R. EvID. 504(a)(4)(C),
(b)(4)(A). This Comment does not address the situation where the prosecution
chooses to compel the spouse victim. See Malinda L. Seymore, Against the Peace and
Dignity of the State: Spousal Violence and Spousal Privilege, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REv. 239 (1995) for a detailed discussion of the spousal crime exception in Texas.
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (holding that "testimonial" statements are inadmissible without prior cross examination and unavailability of the declarant).
6. While the facts presented in this scenario are similar to many domestic violence situations, they are wholly created by the Author.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol12/iss2/10
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V12.I2.9

2

Soulé: The Prosecution’s
Choice: Admitting a Non-testifying
CHOICE Domestic Vio
THE PROSECUTION'S
2006]

through a testifying police officer.7 Texas prosecutors now face objections from defense attorneys and struggle to argue that these types of
statements do not violate Crawford and remain admissible. This
Comment will address two of the possible arguments available under
Texas statute and case law supporting the admission of non-testifying
victim statements through the testimony of the responding officers.
A careful reading of Crawfordshows that its holding does not eliminate the use of non-testifying victim statements because the admission
of such evidence does not violate the Confrontation Clause.8 This
Comment argues that, not withstanding Crawford, Texas prosecutors
have at least two options available that support the admission of such
evidence. 9 One of these options is to argue that a non-testifying victim's statements to a responding police officer are admissible under
the excited utterance hearsay exceptionin the Texas Rules of Evidence and constitute "nontestimonial"' evidence which is not subject
to the requirements of Crawford. The second option is to argue that
the evidence, even if deemed "testimonial" 1 2 and subject to the holding of Crawford, 3 is admissible because the defendant has waived the
right to confrontation under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine,
an equitable rule designed to prevent a benefit from a defendant's
wrongdoing that causes a witness's unavailability. 4
This Comment explores these available options in light of Crawford's holding and reasoning. In Part II this Comment provides an
overview of the background of the Confrontation Clause from its development as a constitutional amendment through its application in
7. Prior to Crawford, courts commonly allowed non-testifying victim's statements
into evidence as excited utterances. See, e.g., Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003); Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 153-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001);
Mumphrey v. State, 155 S.W.3d 651, 658-59 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. ref'd);
Carter v. State, 150 S.W.3d 230, 241 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.); Harris v.
State, 133 S.W.3d 760, 772 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. ref'd).
8. See Adam M. Krischer, "Though justice may "be" blind, it is not stupid:" Applying Common Sense to Crawford v. Washington in Domestic Violence Cases, 38 THE
PROSECUTOR (Nov.-Dec. 2004) (publication available only to members of the National District Attorneys Association) available at http://www.tdcaa.comldynamnews.asp?iid=8.
9. See id.
10. See Krischer, supra note 8.
11. The Supreme Court did not provide definition but gave examples of statements that are non-testimonial. See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington:
Encouragingand Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511,
515-16 (2005).
12. The Supreme Court did not provide a definition "leav[ing it] for another day,"
but did state that "testimonial" evidence includes "prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and . . . police interrogations."
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
13. Id. at 68-69.
14. See id. at 62.
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Ohio v. Roberts 5 and the admissibility of hearsay. 6 Part III examines
Crawford and its holding.1 7 Part IV discusses the policy concerns
leading to the use of police reports and officer testimony in the prosecution of domestic violence cases and the problems that arise in the
prosecution of domestic violence cases.1 8 Part V examines excited utterance in Texas, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's recent opinion defining "testimonial," and how Texas courts may apply this
definition in domestic violence cases.1 9 Finally, Part VI discusses the
applicability of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine.2"

1I.

HEARSAY UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

This section provides an abbreviated history of the Confrontation
Clause from its development in English common-law, to its inclusion
as an amendment to the United States Constitution, to its application
in Ohio v. Roberts.2 1 This section will further address the admission of
hearsay evidence under the Confrontation Clause.
A.

The ConstitutionalAmendment

The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."2 2 The Confrontation
Clause's origins can be found in the English common-law tradition of
"live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing."2 3 In the widely
reported misdemeanor libel case of King v. Paine,the Court of King's
Bench answered the question of whether prior opportunity to crossexamine was required to admit an unavailable witness's pretrial examination in the affirmative.2 4
At the time of the Sixth Amendment's ratification, English courts
were applying the cross-examination rule in felony cases.2 5 Many of
the colonial state's declarations of rights adopted around the time of
15. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra Part VI.
21. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
22. Id. at 62-63; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
3 COMMENTARIES *373-74 (1768)).
24. Id. at 45 (citing King v. Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696)).
25. Id. at 46-47 (citing King v. Dingler, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 383-84 (1791); King v.
Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789); cf. King v. Radbourne, 168 Eng. Rep. 330,
331-32 (1787); 3 Wigmore § 1364, at 23).
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the Revolution contained the right of confrontation. 26 Yet, the Con-

stitution did not have this guarantee, an omission that resulted in criticism. 27 A prominent Anti-federalist writing stated, "[n]othing can be
more essential than the cross[-]examining [of] witnesses, and generally
before the triers of the facts in question ....

[W]ritten evidence...

[is] almost useless; it must be frequently taken ex parte, and but very
seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth. ' '28 In response to the
criticism of its omission, Congress
included the Confrontation Clause
29
in the Sixth Amendment.
B.

Judicial Interpretationof the Clause

A look at state decisions around the time of the Sixth Amendment's

ratification illustrates the original understanding of the Confrontation

Clause.3" In 1794, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in State v.
Webb:31 "[I]t is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice,
that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the
liberty to cross[-]examine." 3' 2 Similarly, the South Carolina Supreme
Court stated "that one of the 'indispensable conditions' implicitly
guaranteed by the State Constitution was that 'prosecutions be carried
on to the conviction of the accused, by witnesses confronted by him,

and subjected to his personal examination.'" 33

In the 1895 case of Mattox v. United States, 34 the Supreme Court
allowed a deceased witness's statement to be admitted when there was
prior opportunity to confront during a previous trial. 35 "The substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in
the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and
26. See id. at 48 (citing Va. Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776); Pa. Declaration of
Rights § IX (1776); Del. Declaration of Rights § 14 (1776); Md. Declaration of Rights
§ XIX (1776); N.C. Declaration of Rights § VII (1776); Vt. Declaration of Rights Ch.
I, § X (1777); Mass. Declaration of Rights § XII (1780); N.H. Bill of Rights § XV
(1783), all reprinted in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 235, 265, 278, 282, 287, 323, 342, 377 (1971)).
27. Id. at 48-49.
28. Id. at 49 (citing R. LEE, LETTER IV BY THE FEDERAL FARMER (Oct. 15, 1787),
reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 469, 473).
29. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-50 (citing Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass.
434, 437 (1837); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431,435-36 (1858); State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103
(1794) (per curiam); State v. Campbell, 1 Rich. 124, 1844 WL 2558 (S.C.1844); State v.
Hill, 2 Hill (SC) 607, 608-10 (S.C. 1835); Kendrick v. State, 29 Tenn. 479, 485-88
(1850); Bostick v. State, 22 Tenn. 344, 345-46 (1842); Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. 58, 59
(1821).
31. State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103 (1794).
32. Id. at 104.
33. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-50 (quoting Campbell, 30 S.C.L. 124).
34. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), cited in Crawford,541 U.S. at 54.
35. Id. at 237.
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of subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination. This, the law
says, he shall under no circumstances be deprived of .... ""
Later Supreme Court decisions continued to allow admission of witness statements only if there was a prior opportunity to crossexamine3 7 and additionally required a showing of witness unavailability.3 8 When a hearsay statement was "nontestimonial," the Court considered reliability over the chance to cross-examine.3 9 "Our cases
have thus remained faithful to the Framers' understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only
where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine."4 0 In 1980, the Supreme
Court provided a test in Ohio v. Roberts4 1 that "conditions the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on whether it falls under a 'firmly
rooted hearsay exception' or bears 'particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness.'
III.

"42

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: THE CASE AND ITS HOLDING

Michael Crawford was charged with assault and attempted murder
of a man that he contended had attempted to rape his wife Sylvia.43
Although she was present during the incident and gave a statement,
Sylvia did not testify at the trial because Crawford invoked the right
of marital privilege available to him under Washington law. 44 However, the privilege did not bar admission of a spouse's out-of-court
statement found admissible under a hearsay exception.4 5 Therefore,
the prosecution introduced Sylvia's tape-recorded statement made
during a police interrogation using the exception of statement against
penal interest.4 6
Michael objected to the admission of Sylvia's statement, arguing
that its admission violated the Confrontation Clause by denying him
36. Id. at 244 (quoted in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).
37. The Crawford Court cited cases as support for prior to trial or preliminary
hearing testimony admissibility being dependant on the defendant having an adequate opportunity to cross-examine. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57 (citing Mancusi v.
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16 (1972); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-68 (1970);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-08 (1965); cf Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47,
55-61 (1899)).
38. The Crawford Court also cited cases as support that prior to trial or preliminary hearing testimony admissibility is also dependent on unavailability of the witness. See id. (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25 (1968); cf. Motes v. United
States, 178 U.S. 458, 470-71 (1900)).
39. Id. (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-89 (1970) (plurality opinion)).
40. Id. at 59.
41. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
42. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
43. Id. at 38.
44. Id. at 40.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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the right to confront the witness against. him.4 7 Applying the Roberts48 test, the trial court admitted the statement on the ground that it
bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. ' 49 Washington's
intermediate appellate court rejected Sylvia's statement as unreliable
and reversed Michael's conviction. 50 The Washington Supreme Court
reinstated the conviction, finding that, under Roberts,5 1 Sylvia's statement was admissible because it was trustworthy.52
The Supreme Court, "concerned with the use of testimonial evidence obtained under coercive conditions," reversed the Washington
Supreme Court. 53 The Court noted circumstances that indicated coercive conditions surrounding Sylvia's statement-she was in custody,
the police read her the Miranda warnings, she was tape-recorded, she
was told that her release was conditioned on the progress of the investigation, and the police interrogated her twice through structured
questions.54
The Supreme Court overruled Roberts55 because of its "unpardonable vice . . . [of] demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude."5 6
The Court further held that "testimonial" statements cannot be admitted unless there is a showing of witness unavailability and prior opportunity to cross. 57 For emphasis, the Court cited numerous cases in
which the courts admitted accomplice confessions and "testimonial"
hearsay statements in violation of the Sixth Amendment under the
Roberts test.5 8 The Supreme Court criticized the test as:
[D]epart[ing] from the historical principles . . . in two respects.
First, it is too broad: It applies the same mode of analysis whether
or not the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony .... At the same
time, however, the test is too narrow: It admits statements that do
consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of reliability. This
malleable standard often
fails to protect against paradigmatic con59
frontation violations.
47. Id.
48. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
49. Id. at 66.
50. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41.
51. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
52. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41.
53. Sally Carter, State's Trial Brief on the Excited-Utterance Exception to the
Hearsay Rule in the Light of Crawford v. Washington, http://www.tdcaa.com/dynamnews.asp?iid=8 (last visited Feb. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Trial Brief] (template brief
outlining the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule).
54. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4, 65.
55. 448 U.S. at 56.
56. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
57. Id. at 68.
58. Id. at 63-65.
59. Id. at 60.
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In response to Roberts's "unpredictability," 60 the Supreme Court
held that "[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability
and a prior opportunity for cross-examination."6 1 The Court made a
distinction between "testimonial" and "nontestimonial," but left "for
another day" a comprehensive definition of "testimonial. '6 2 Although the Court did not provide its own definition, it did cite three
definitions furthered by others:
[1] ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is,
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially . . .; [2] extrajudicial statements . . .contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions, [and, 3] statements that were made
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial.63
IV.

THE PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES

This section discusses the policy concerns leading to the use of police reports and officer testimony in the prosecution of domestic violence cases and the problems that arise during the prosecution of
domestic violence cases. Society once regarded domestic violence as a
private matter that occurred only occasionally. 64 However, the truth
is that while an isolated act of domestic violence may appear insignificant, there is a likelihood that the future acts will increase in intensity
and severity. 65 There has been a growing awareness and recognition
of the seriousness of domestic violence as a crime with "devastating
and even fatal consequences" among state and federal legislatures,
courts, law enforcement authorities, and even the general public.6 6
National, state, and local efforts to prevent this problem have led to
more active police and prosecutorial response to complaints of domestic violence. 67 "A complaint of domestic violence ... is now almost
certain to result in a police officer making a prompt investigative visit,
and usually an arrest," with68 prosecution occurring with or without the
cooperation of the victim.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
PA.

Id. at 63.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).
See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-in Testimony, 150 U.

L. REV. 1171, 1182 (2002).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1182-83.
67. See id. at 1182.
68. Id. at 1181.
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This change in view has also resulted in greater governmental efforts to prevent and prosecute domestic violence. 69 These efforts include making personal protection more available, increasing penalties
for abusers, and intensifying the investigation and prosecution of domestic violence cases. 70 For example, many prosecutors have adopted
"aggressive new tactics for getting convictions," like a "mandatory
prosecution" or "no drop" policy, under which a prosecutor will prosecute the defendant with or without the victim, sometimes even when
the victim objects. 7 1 Furthermore, Congress has provided funds to
further the efforts taken by state and local governments, who carry
the majority of the burden in curbing crime.72
Domestic violence victims commonly refuse to participate in the
prosecution of their abuser.7 3 This may be because the victims have
reunited with their abuser, fear retaliation, or both.7 ' Additionally,
when the case involves spouses, the defendant spouse may claim marital privilege, if it is provided for in the defendant's jurisdiction.7 5
Under Texas Rules of Evidence, only the spouse of the defendant in a
criminal trial may invoke a privilege not to be called by the state as a
witness. 76 This rule further states that the privilege does not apply
"[in any proceeding in which the person is charged with a crime
against the person's spouse."' 77 Although Sally may be compelled to
testify against Fred, "[m]andated participation is neither an ideal nor a
guaranteed solution to the problem of domestic violence. '7 8 This
presents the sometimes insurmountable challenge of securing the unwilling victim's availability to testify at trial, especially when the victim
"disappears" to avoid giving testimony. 79 When faced with these situations, a prosecutor often chooses to offer evidence of the victim's
statements through the police officers who responded to a 911 call or
were involved in the investigation of the case.80
Despite these new approaches and changes in the law, domestic violence remains a difficult crime to prosecute because of uncooperative
victims, a public that remains largely uncaring, and overwhelming
69. See id. at 1182.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 1188.
72. See id. at 1182-83.
73. See Sherrie Bourg Carter & Bruce M. Lyons, Child Abuse, Elderly Abuse and
Domestic Violence Litigation, CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 2004 at 23.
74. Id.
75. Id. This is not provided for in Texas in cases where one spouse is charged with
a crime against another. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.10 (Vernon 2005);
TEX. R. EVID. 504(a)(4)(C), (b)(4)(A).
76. TEX. R. EVID. 504(b)(1).
77. TEX. R. EVID. 504(b)(4)(A).
78. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participationin Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1885 (1996).
79. See Carter & Lyons, supra at note 74, at 23.
80. See id.
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caseloads.8 1 When the victim is unwilling to testify, evidence-based
prosecution allows the trial to continue without the victim's testimony
by presenting other evidence, such as police officer reports and testimony." Some believe the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford
threatens this valuable tool by its requirement of unavailability and
prior opportunity to cross-examine for the admission of hearsay
testimony.83
Evidence-based prosecution serves as a vital tool in domestic violence prosecution. 84 Crawford's apparent requirement of the declarant's unavailability and prior opportunity to cross-examine appears to
preclude the admission of evidence such as victim statements to the
police.8 These statements are hearsay and generally take the form of
either the victim's spontaneous statements made to responding officers when they arrived or statements taken by officers during their
investigation, where there may have been time for the victim to reflect.8 6 Hearsay statements made by a victim who has had time for
reflection should be excluded and are not admissible under Crawford.87 In contrast, a victim's spontaneous statements generally fall
under an exception to the hearsay rule-spontaneous utterances, 8
otherwise known as excited utterances.8 9 When an argument in favor
of a statement's admissibility is based on this exception, there is a
greater chance for admission.9 0
Yet, admitting statements as excited utterance becomes doubtful after Crawford, because the Court implied a strict application, stating
that "to the extent the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations
existed at all, it required that the statements be made 'immediat[ely]
upon the hurt received, and before [the declarant] had time to devise
or contrive anything for her own advantage."' 9 1 Therefore, statements made by victims to the arriving officers may not qualify as excited utterances because the time span between the incident being
reported to police and their arrival can range from minutes to days.92
On a regular basis, prosecutors present absent victim statements as
evidence and, in order to follow Crawford, "must continue . . . [to
81. See Krischer, supra note 8.
82. See id.
83. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
84. See Krischer, supra note 8.
85. See id.
86. See Carter & Lyons, supra at note 74, at 23.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Carolyn B. Tapie, The Crying Game: How Hunt v. State Unnecessarily
Expands the Definition of an Excited Utterance in Texas, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 723, 749
(2004).
90. See Carter & Lyons, supra at note 74, at 23.
91. Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n. 8 (2004)).
92. Id.
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argue] ... that Crawford does not bar traditional evidence in evidence
based prosecutions."9 3
Although the actual impact of Crawford on litigation in abuse cases
remains to be seen, the reality is that Crawford has opened the door
to what promises to be an onslaught of challenges to hearsay exceptions, which likely will result in the exclusion of hearsay that historically has been widely relied upon by the government to help prove
its cases. In some cases, the impact may be crippling to the prosecution. Therefore, the stage is set for attempts by the government to
have hearsay admitted under other exceptions that 94
are firmly
rooted and not dependent upon judicial determinations.
Prosecutors must argue that the admission of evidence, such as a victim's statement through police officer reports and testimony, does not
violate the Confrontation Clause because: (1) the evidence is "nontestimonial" and admissible under the excited utterance exception and
(2) even if the evidence is "testimonial," the defendant has forfeited
the right to confrontation.95
V.

EXCITED UTrERANCES

In dicta, the Supreme Court suggested that "testimonial" statements are those which an "objective witness" would reasonably believe would be available for later use at trial.96 An excited utterance is
defined as "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event or condition." 97
A.

Excited Utterance in Texas

The Texas Criminal Court of Appeals9' stated that there is a psychological rationale for the exception: the event is speaking and not
the person.99 "When a man is in the instant grip of violent emotion,
excitement or pain, he ordinarily loses the capacity for reflection necessary to the fabrication of a falsehood and the 'truth will come
out."'
According to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the critical factor in determining whether a statement qualifies under the ex93. Krischer, supra note 8 (italics added).
94. Carter & Lyons, supra note 74, at 24.
95. See Krischer, supra note 8.
96. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (quoting Brief for Nat'l Ass'n
of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, 2003 WL
21754961).
97. FED. R. EVID. 803(2); TEX. R. EVID. 803(2).
98. For readers not familiar with the bifurcated Texas judicial system, the Court of
Criminal Appeals has "final appellate and review jurisdiction in criminal cases" with
discretionary review in all but death penalty cases. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
4.04 § 2 (Vernon 2005).
99. See Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
100. Id. (quoting Evans v. State, 480 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)).
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ception "is whether, at the time of the statement, 'the declarant was
still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the
event."" 1 Plainly stated, a statement qualifies as an excited utterance if made "under such circumstances as would reasonably show
that it resulted from impulse rather than reason and reflection.' ' 1°2 To
meet this showing, a party must "lay a factual predicate to show that
the declarant was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or
pain of the event."1 3

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals strengthens this requirement
when statements made in response to police officer questions'°4 are
offered under the excited utterance exception, 0

5

with an additional

requirement on the offering party to show that the questions were
07
non-coercive. 10 6 This requirement was illustrated in Ward v. State
when the Court of Criminal Appeals found that a defendant's wife's

statements made at the crime scene were not admissible as excited
utterances because the statements were made after her husband's arrest, after she spoke to a lawyer, after she told the police she did not
want to make a statement, and, finally, only after further police questioning. 10 8 The case law from the Court of Criminal Appeals implies

recognition that a statement made in response to non-coercive questions posed by an officer when the witness is "still dominated by the
emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of an exciting event" is admissible
as an excited utterance. 10 9
It is also worthy to note that while the Supreme Court heard arguments to implement a broad ban on statements made to police, it
chose a limited ban that did not include excited utterances." 0 The
Court chose to use the restrictive term of "interrogation" instead of
including every statement police officers collect during a criminal in-

vestigation or by questioning witnesses in its definition of "testimo101. Id. at 596 (quoting McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992)).
102. Id. (quoting Fowler v. State, 379 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964)).
103. Trial Brief, supra note 53, at 1 (citing Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595-96).
104. Other state courts have held a question-and-answer format does not destroy
an excited utterance foundation and have admitted such testimony. See State v. Hernandez, 987 P.2d 1156, 1159 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming the trial court's finding
that complainant's answers to police questions fell within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule); State v. Wallace, 524 N.E.2d 466, 472 (Ohio 1988) (holding
"that the admission of a declaration as an excited utterance is not precluded by
questioning").
105. Trial Brief, supra note 53, at 1.
106. See Trial Brief, supra note 53, at 2.
107. Ward v. State, 657 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
108. See id. at 136.
109. Trial Brief, supra note 53, at 2 (citing Lawton, 913 S.W.2d at 553-54; McFarland, 845 S.W.2d at 845-46; Ward, 657 S.W.2d at 135-36).
110. See id. at 5; Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36 (No.
02-9410), 2003 WL 22705281 ("[C]ertainly when somebody is talking to a police officer, that's the kind of a statement they understand is going to be used in court.").
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nial" evidence.11 1 "This careful choice indicates that genuine excited
utterances in response to police questions
are [typically] 'nontestimo' 12
nial' and not affected by Crawford."
B.

Texas Courts Defining "Testimonial" Under Crawford

Crawford held that while "testimonial" statements invoke the right
to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, "nontestimonial" statements are exempt from Confrontation Clause scrutiny.11 3 While the
Supreme Court refused to define "testimonial," in dicta it suggested
that they are statements "made in contemplation of future litigation.""4 The refusal of the Supreme Court in Crawford to give a definition of "testimonial" leaves the determination to the trial court and
"suggests that the majority contemplates that in classifying hearsay as
'testimonial' or 'non-testimonial,' the trial judge should consider the
specific circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. "115
This requires that the judge characterize a statement as "testimonial"
if it is made to a police officer in circumstances where the officer is
clearly gathering information that may be used in a trial.11 6 "An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.' 1 7
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals first addressed the meaning
of "testimonial" in Woods v. State." 8 In this case, the appellant argued that his co-defendant's statements to two acquaintances were
"testimonial" and thus inadmissible." 9 After determining that the
statements met the requirements for declaration against interest, the
Court of Criminal Appeals found that the co-defendant's remarks
were "nontestimonial" because they were "casual remarks ...spontaneously made to acquaintances' 12 ° and did not fall within the categories of testimonial evidence described in Crawford. 2 '
111. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 68.
112. Trial Brief, supra note 53, at 5.
113. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
114. Krischer, supra note 8. In October 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 552 (U.S. Oct.
31, 2005) (No. 05-5705), and State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S.Ct. 547 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2005) (No. 05-5224). With oral arguments scheduled for
March 20, 2006, the Court may soon provide its own definition of "testimonial."
115. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Treatment of Prosecution Hearsay Under Crawford v. Washington: Some Good News, But..., 28-OCT CHAMPION 16, 18 (2004).
116. Id.
117. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
118. Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
119. Id. at 114.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 114 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
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The next time the Court of Criminal Appeals faced defining "testimonial" was in Wall v. State.122 In 2004, prior to the Crawford decision, Roger M. Wall was convicted of aggravated assault. 123 While
receiving medical treatment at a hospital, Donald Norman, the assault
1 24
victim, provided a statement in response to an officer's question.
For reasons not stated in the opinion, Norman was unavailable to testify at trial and his statements were admitted through the questioning
officer's testimony. 1 25 Wall objected to the admission of this testimony, which was admitted under
the excited utterance exception of
26
the Texas Rules of Evidence.'
On appeal, Wall argued that the admission of Norman's statement
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 2 7 The Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals identified "[tihe fundamental issue
presented in this appeal is whether a non-testifying witness's statement made to a police officer during investigation of a crime and in128
criminating the defendant, is admissible against the defendant.
Crawford was decided while this case was pending before the appellate court, so the appellate court applied the Crawford holding to this
case.

12 9

The court stated that "[t]he threshold question imposed by Crawford is whether the proffered out-of-court statement is 'testimonial' in
nature.'130 The court further noted that a determination that a statement is "testimonial" would implicate the Sixth Amendment and require unavailability and prior opportunity to cross.' 3 ' In its analysis of
what constitutes "testimonial," the court took notice of the Supreme
Court's colloquial usage of interrogation rather than a technical legal
usage. 32 The court also noted that the Supreme Court "stated specifically, however, that a recorded statement 'knowingly given in response to structured police questioning, qualifies [as interrogation]
under any conceivable definition. ' , 1 33 The court concluded that because a police interview of a witness is "structured police questioning"
122. Wall v. State, No. PD-1631-04, 2006 WL 119575 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 18,
2006).
123. Wall v. State, 143 S.W.3d 846, 846 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004), affd as
modified and remanded by Wall v. State, 2006 WL 119575 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 18,
2006, no pet. h.).
124. Id. at 848.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 849.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 850.
130. Id. (citing Brooks v. State, 132 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no
pet. h.)).
131. Id. at 850-51 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004)).
132. Id. at 851 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53, n. 4).
133. Id.
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and, therefore, it is "testimonial" under
it is an "interrogation"
34
Crawford.'
The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the Corpus Christi
court's finding that Norman's statements to the interviewing officer
were "testimonial" and their admission violated the standard set out
by Crawford.'35 However, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not
adopt the reasoning of the Corpus Christi court that structured questioning by police is an interrogation and thus "testimonial." Additionally, the court declined to adopt the position that excited utterances
are per se "nontestimonial."' 3 6 The court instead adopted a case-bycase approach, stating that an inquiring court "must look to the attendant circumstances and assess the likelihood that a reasonable perto make a
son would have either retained or regained the capacity
1' 3 7
testimonial statement at the time of the utterance.'
The court presented a two step approach in determining the admissibility of statements as excited utterance. 1 38 The court stated that
while each step is separate, they are related because both consider the
circumstances surrounding the declarant at the time of the statement.1 39 The first step is to determine whether the statement meets
the requirements of excited utterance, "focus[ing] on whether the declarant was under the stress of a startling event."' 4 ° If, and only if, the
statement is an excited utterance, the court next "look[s] to the attendant circumstances and assess[es] the likelihood that a reasonable
person would have either retained or regained the capacity to make a
testimonial statement at the time of the utterance," with the focus "on
whether a reasonable declarant, similarly situated (that is, excited by
the stress of a startling event), would have had14the capacity to appreciate the legal ramifications of her statement.' '
C. Applying Wall in Domestic Violence Cases
While the facts in Wall do not implicate domestic violence, its reasoning and holding have implications on the practice of admitting the
non-testifying witnesses statements through the responding police officer. This case provides for Texas courts a definition of "testimonial"
as a statement where an objective witness reasonably foresees that
their statement will be used at a later trial.' 42 In addition to this definition, the court laid out a process of determining the admissibility of
134.
135.
2006).
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Wall v. State, No. PD-1631-04, 2006 WL 119575, *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 18,
Id. at *5, n.36.
Id. at *5 (quoting United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2005)).
See id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Brito, 427 F.3d at 61-62).
Id. (quoting Brito, 427 F.3d at 61-62).
See id.
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statements as excited utterances which will generally allow excited
statements made by victims of domestic violence to police officers responding to the scene.
Prior to the Wall decision, two Texas Courts of Appeals held that
statements made by a domestic violence victim to officers during the
initial assessment and securing of a crime scene are not "testimonial"
and therefore Crawford does not apply. 143 Below, the holdings and
reasoning of these cases will be discussed in light of the holding and
reasoning of Wall.
In Key v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals was faced with a domestic violence case where the trial court admitted the victim's statements
to the responding police officers and the victim did not testify. 14 In
its discussion of the federal right to confrontation of witnesses, the
court noted a common thread among the "testimonial" statements
cited by the Supreme Court in Crawford: "[AjII involve a declarant's
knowing responses to structured questioning in an investigative environment or a courtroom setting where the declarant would reasonably
expect that his or her responses might be used in future judicial proceedings." The court determined that the question before them was
what constituted a police interrogation. 1 45 The court concluded that
as a matter of law excited utterances were not "testimonial":
[W]e are persuaded that the underlying rationale of an excited utterance supports a determination that it is not testimonial in nature.
Such a declaration from one who has recently endured physical
abuse, and with no time for reflection or deliberation, is likely to be
truthful. It is consistent with the definition of an excited utterance
to conclude that it is not a statement that has been made in contemplation of its use in a future trial.
While the Court of Criminal Appeals did not agree that an excited
utterance statement is per se "nontestimonial," the outcome of the
Key case remains the same when applying the two step test set forth in
Wall. 1 46 Here, the court would first address whether the statements
admitted met the requirements of excited utterance. 4 7 The facts
available in the opinion described a situation where a police officer,
responding to a disturbance call, observed the declarant arguing with
the defendant. 48 Without any explanation in the opinion as to what
143. See Key v. State, 173 S.W.3d 72, 76 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2005), abrogatedby Wall
v. State, 2006 WL 119575 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 18, 2006); Spencer v. State, 162
S.W.3d 877, 881 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd).
144. Key, 173 S.W.3d at 73.
145. Id. at 74.
146. See Wall, 2006 WL 119575, at *5, n.36 (acknowledging that in the event of an
excited utterance the declarant is unlikely to be "focusing on preservation rather than
communication of information" and will not reasonably foresee the future use of their
statements).
147. See id. at *5.

148. See Key, 173 S.W.3d at 73.
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prompted the statements, the declarant told the officer that the defendant had restrained her and "[s]he had just run from the house and
149
[the defendant] had grabbed her and pulled her to the ground.
She also "indicated that she feared" the defendant."' 0 Additionally, in
his brief, the defendant conceded
that the statements met the require151
ments of excited utterance.
Meeting the first requirement, the court would then consider
whether a reasonable declarant, excited by the "stress of a startling
event," would have foreseen the use of her statements at a later
trial.' 52 The Court of Criminal Appeals offered guidance in this determination when it stated that:
[Gienerally statements made to police while the declarant (or another person) is still in personal danger are not made with consideration of their legal ramifications because the declarant usually
speaks out of urgency and a desire to obtain a prompt response;
153
thus, those statements will not normally be deemed testimonial.
The court went on to quote Brito, noting: "If the record fairly supports
a finding of comprehension [of the legal ramifications of the statement], the fact that the statement also qualifies as an excited utterance
will not alter its testimonial nature. ' 154 The facts presented in the
Corpus Christi court's opinion appear to support a determination that
the declarant was still in personal danger and the statements where
made with a desire to obtain help from the officer, rather than to provide information in a criminal investigation. Therefore, the court
would likely find that the statements were "nontestimonial."
While agreeing with the Key court that a police officer's questions
while assessing and securing a scene are not an interrogation, the 14th
District Court of Houston declined to hold that excited utterances are
"nontestimonial" as a matter of law. 1 55 In Spencer v. State, the court
considered an appeal for domestic assault where the trial court allowed the victim's statements that the appellant hit her, through the
testimony of the responding officers.' 56 The court stated that whether
a statement was an excited utterance is a factor in determining if it is
"testimonial," but that it could "imagine a situation in which officers
secure a scene and then begin formal, structured questioning of witnesses (or the victim) who are still under the stress of the situation,"
and did not believe the responses to this type of questioning would be
149. Id.

150. Id.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 76.
See Wall, 2006 WL 119575, at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id. (quoting United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2005)).

155. Spencer v. State, 162 S.W.3d 877, 880-81 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2005, pet. ref d).
156. Id. at 878.
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"nontestimonial."' 57 The court found that "simple, preliminary question[ing] designed to ensure the safety of those on the scene does not
amount to interrogation ...[blecause they bear no indicia of the formal, structured questions necessary for statements to be

testimonial. "158
Spencer is in alignment with the Court of Criminal Appeals decision
in Wall. While Wall does not require that police questioning "bear no
indicia of... formal, structured question[ing],"' 9 this would be a circumstance to consider when determining if a reasonable person would
have reasonably known they were being questioned as part of a criminal investigation.1 6
VI.

THE FORFEITURE-BY-WRONGDOING

DOCTRINE

A second argument for the admission of a victim's statements to
police when the victim refuses to testify is found in the forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine, which provides an equitable relief designed to
prevent defendants from benefiting when their wrongdoing causes the
v.
witness's unavailability.1 6 ' Crawford approvingly cites Reynolds
1 63
United States,162 the first application of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing.
In Reynolds, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he Constitution does
not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences
of his own wrongful acts. '""6 While the Confrontation Clause protects
the right of all criminal defendants to confront a witness, "if [the defendant] voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his
privilege., 1 65 This exception finds its basis in the belief that wrongdoers should not reap benefit from their wrongdoing. 6 6 In the 1900 case
of Motes v. United States,167 the Supreme Court appeared to expand
the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine "to allow admission of uncrossexamined depositions not made under oath, if the witness was 'absent
from the trial by the suggestion, procurement or act of the ac157. Id. at 881.
158. Id. at 883.
159. See id.
160. See Wall v. State, No. PD-1631-04, 2006 WL 119575, at *7 (Tex. Crim. App.
Jan. 18, 2006). Additionally, footnote 37 included a North Carolina case where the
police officer's role was considered in determining whether statements were "testimonial" because statements made in response to a patrol officer's fact gathering questions are likely non-testimonial, while statements made in response to an
investigator's question are likely testimonial. Id. at *5 n.37 (quoting State v. Lewis,
619 S.E.2d 830, 842 (N.C. 2005)).
161. See Krischer, supra note 8.
162. Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
163. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
164. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 159.
167. See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900).
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cused.""

68

This common law doctrine case was eventually codified as

Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6).

69

Courts have defined procurement as including "persuasion, the
wrongful disclosure of information, control by the suspect, acquiescence in others performing acts of procurement, and asking others to
persuade the witness not to testify."' 7 ° The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
doctrine works to prevent a defendant from securing a witness's unavailability at trial.' 7 ' The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is not
based on the timing of the defendant's act but whether their act has
caused a witness's unavailability.1 72 "Thus, the question should be,
was the accused's act responsible for the witness being unavailable to

testify?"1

73

To satisfy Reynolds in a domestic violence case, the State will have
to prove the victim's unavailability was "a factual result of the defendant's misconduct."' 74 To prove this, the State will have to demonstrate "that: (1) the witness suffers from significant trauma that
precludes the witness from communicating effectively to the court; (2)
the trauma is the factual result of the defendant's actions; and (3) the
defendant's actions causing the trauma were wrongful."' 7 5
Showing that domestic violence causes unavailability is not far-

reaching considering that a victim's refusal to cooperate often stems
from concerns and fears "of retaliation and additional violence by the
abuser if they participate in the criminal process or testify against the
offender."1'76 Domestic violence abusers often tell their victims "that
168. Tom Harbinson, Using the Crawford v. Washington "Forfeiture by Wrongdoing" Confrontation Clause Exception in Child Abuse Cases, http://www.tdcaa.com/
dynam-news.asp?iid=8 (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) (quoting Motes, 178 U.S. at 471
(un-cross examined depositions not taken under oath would violate confrontation unless procurement occurred)).
169. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); Enrico B. Valdez & Shelley A. Nieto Dahlberg, Tales
From the Crypt.- An Examination of Forfeiture by Misconduct and Applicability to the
Texas Legal System, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 99, 102 (1999).
170. Harbinson, supra note 168 (citing Motes, 178 U.S. at 471 (persuasion); United
States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47-48 (2nd Cir. 1992) (defendant threatened to expose
witness's criminal activity if witness testified); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1199
(6th Cir. 1982) (witness under control of defendants who procured her refusal to testify), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053 (1983); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269,
273-74 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant knew witness would be murdered and did nothing to
stop it); United States v. Belano, 618 F.2d 624, 629-30 (10th Cir. 1970) (threats by
defendant communicated by bartenders to victim)).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Kevin Landtroop, Fear Not, Family Violence Prosecutors: Using the Forfeiture
by Wrongdoing Exception to Admit Victim Statements After Crawford, http://www.
tdcaa.com/dynam-news.asp?iid=8 (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
175. Id.
176. National District Attorneys Association Policy Positions on Domestic Violence 4 (adopted on Oct. 23, 2004), availableat http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/domestic
_violence-policy-oct_23_2004.pdf.
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there is nothing that the victim[s] can do about the abuse and that no
one will believe [or help them]."1'77 Additionally, because of past unpleasant experiences with the criminal system, victims can lack "faith
in the criminal justice system's ability to either hold the offender accountable or to provide for [their] protection."' 7 8 These experiences
only confirm what their abusers have told them, causing victims to
nothing that can be done
accept the abuse and believe that there is179
about the abuse and that there is no help.
While there is no Texas statutory counterpart to Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(6), in Gonzalez v. State, 8 ° the San Antonio Court of
Appeals applied the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine and held that
a defendant forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights and there was
no error when the trial court admitted the victim's statements to police under the excited utterance exception. 181 When several San
Antonio Police Department officers arrived at the home of Maria and
Baldomero Herrera after receiving two 911 calls, they observed Maria
lying in a pool of blood near the front door. 18 2 The officers questioned Maria about what had happened, and she responded that she
and her husband were shot by an eighteen-year-old Latin male with
dyed, blonde hair that was living with or known by the people living in
the rock house across the street. 183 She also informed them that the
gunman stole her white Nissan truck.'8 4 Based on this information,
officers apprehended Ray Gonzales, an individual fitting Maria's
description and driving her stolen Nissan truck.' 8 5 Maria and
and Gonzalez was
Baldomero died from their gunshot wounds
18 6
charged and convicted of capital murder.
Gonzales argued on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting
Maria's statements through the testimony of the responding police officers.' 87 Gonzalez contended that because Maria's statements were
made in response to questioning they did not qualify as excited utterances and their admission violated his right to confrontation because
and he had no prior opportunity to cross-exthey were "testimonial"
188
amine Maria.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet.
granted). Author notes for the reader that this case was granted discretionary review
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on Sept. 28, 2005 with oral arguments scheduled for March 29, 2006.
181. See id. at 609-11.
182. Id. at 605.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 606.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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The San Antonio Court of Appeals began its analysis by determining that Maria's statements to responding officers were admissible as
excited utterances. 18 9 The court then tried to determine whether or
not these statements were "testimonial" and therefore inadmissible in
light of Crawford.9 ° The court determined that they did not need to
resolve this question because Gonzalez forfeited his right of confrontation under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, and stated in a
footnote that Maria's statements would likely be considered "nontestimonial" because of the unstructured interaction between her and the
officers. 19' The court noted that the Supreme Court continued to recognize the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, which "extinguishes
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds."' 9 2 Based on
this, the court held that "[a] defendant whose wrongful act renders a
witness unavailable for trial benefits from his conduct if he can use the
witness's unavailability to exclude otherwise admissible hearsay statements"' 9 3 and thus should be precluded from objecting to their admission on Confrontation Clause grounds. 94
Prosecutors must educate judges by demonstrating that domestic violence is an ongoing, systematic abuse that procures the victim's unavailability. 95 This education could be presented through the
testimony of "police witnesses, family members, friends, victim advocates and medical providers" chronicling the history of domestic violence involved in a particular case. 9 6 Additionally, prosecutors could
prove that a defendant sought to procure the victim's refusal to cooperate "through telephone records, recorded voice-mail and other
messages [such as letters or emails], and testimony of other witnesses."1 97 Intervention by police and prosecutors does not necessarily mean an end to abuse for the victim.' 98 Studies have shown that
many abusers become more violent to reassert control over the victim
and use this control to stop their victims from participating in the
abuser's prosecution.' 99 In many cases, the defendant commits no additional acts, but the victim is so traumatized or threatened by the
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defendant that she refuses to cooperate from the start of the investigation, thereby securing the victim's unavailability. 0 0 No matter what
the reason for the victim's unavailability-fear of retaliation, physical
terror, or a desire to please and remain with the abuser-the abuse
itself is the manner of procurement. 20 1 "For the rule of forfeiture to
have any meaning, domestic
abusers must not be allowed to beat their
20 2
partners out of court.
VII.

THE RESPONSE

Knowing the options, the prosecutor argues to the court that Sally's
statements to the responding officer fall under the excited utterance
hearsay exception, still allowed under Crawford. Further, the statements do not implicate the Confrontation Clause because they are
"nontestimonial": Sally's statements were statements made to the responding officer for the purpose of securing assistance and not the
product of structured questioning or interrogation. The prosecutor
also argues that in the alternative, should the court find that the statements are "testimonial," they are still admissible under the forfeitureby-wrongdoing doctrine because Fred's emotional and physical abuse
has caused Sally's unavailability to testify.
The court, applying the Wall test, finds the first argument compelling and allows the prosecutor to admit the statements Sally made to
the responding officer at the scene.
Although the Court's decision in Crawford limits the prosecution of
domestic violence cases where the victim is unwilling to testify, the
imposed limits are not absolute bars to the practice of admitting the
non-testifying victim's statements through a testifying police officer.
Prosecutors must educate themselves, judges, and police officers
about the two options available to them under Texas law: (1) that a
non-testifying victim's
statements to a responding police officer are
"nontestimonial '2" 3 and admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception and/or (2) that the defendant has waived their right to
confrontation under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine.2 °4
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